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ARISTOTLE ON THE MECHANICS OF THOUGHT: ABSTRACT
Michael V. Wedin
University of California, Davis
A number of crucial but quite difficult theses shape
Aristotle's discussion of thought. Even if we put aside the most
infamous of these. De Anima III.5's distinction between produc
tive and receptive mind, there remains much that is puzzling.
Consider: (1) the mind in activity is the same as the object of
thought; (2) thinking is caused by the object of thought; (3)
thinking is up to us []; (4) the object of thought is somehow in
the soul; (5) thought is of the universal.
It is clear that Aristotle regards these as central to his
account of thinking. What is not clear is their exact role.
Indeed, it is unclear whether they can be fit into a single,
unified account at all. The paper attempts just such an account.
And it does so, in part, by relating the theses to the notorious
productive — receptive mind distinction.
A background assumption of the paper is that in De Anima
Aristotle takes seriously the notion of levels of explanation.
Evident in De Anima I.4's early reminder that we should say not
that the mind thinks but rather that Socrates thinks in virtue of
his mind, the assumption is featured centrally in his account of
thought. Roughly, this works as follows. De Anima accepts as fact
that we are able to exercise a variety of cognitive functions.
The most impressive of these is thought, especially theoretical
thought. In particular. De Anima aims to say something about how
persons, more exactly their souls, must be structured or or
ganized in order to accomplish this. It is not enough to say that
persons think in virtue of their minds. That will locate but it
will not explain the requisite mechanisms. On the reading I shall
propose, all five theses, as well as the distinction between
productive and receptive mind, concern the cognitive mechanisms
underlying thinking.
Thus, the so-called productive and receptive minds should
not be seen as two separate entities. Rather they are parts or
features of the mind, lower level mechanisms, introduced to
explain, for example, how from a ready stock of concepts persons
are able to think autonomously. They are, in short, part of the
cognitive equipment needed to explain thinking. Likewise 1-5 are
best seen as figuring in an account of the cognitive mechanisms
required for thought. Thus, to take an example, (1) is not to be
explained as a Pre-socratic remnant nor as the result of accept
ing a misleading analogy between perception and thought. Rather
it proposes a cognitivist style explanation of the role of inter
nal states in episodes of thinking, in particular, how mental
states can represent objects of thought.
Some attention is devoted to clarifying and tracing
relation between these theses but most of it is directed
In particular, I puzzle out what Aristotle might mean in
that it is by contact [αφή] with the νοητόν that vour is

the
at (2).
saying
brought

to active thinking. This is especially puzzling in light of the
fact that (5) appears to require that a system that is par
ticular, namely the mind of the individual person, is causally
effected by a universal. This difficulty is resolved by focusing
on the way a particular system might be capable of representing
universal propositions and by taking advantage of what so far has
been seen as a claim incompatible with (5) — namely. Metaphysics
XIII.10's claim that the object of active knowing is not univer
sal but particular. In the course of discussing (2) I suggest a
way to honor De Anima III.6's apparent interest in thought of
incomposite objects without committing the account to the objec
tion that such "non-discursive" thought entails the absurdity
that one can think an object without thinking anything about it.

